Fair Housing and Roommates: Contesting a Presumption of Constitutionality by Wright, Brooke
BYU Law Review
Volume 2009 | Issue 5 Article 6
12-1-2009
Fair Housing and Roommates: Contesting a
Presumption of Constitutionality
Brooke Wright
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Housing Law Commons, and the Public Relations and
Advertising Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brooke Wright, Fair Housing and Roommates: Contesting a Presumption of Constitutionality, 2009 BYU L. Rev. 1341 (2009).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2009/iss5/6
DO NOT DELETE 11/19/2009 7:14 PM 
 
1341 
Fair Housing and Roommates: Contesting a 
Presumption of Constitutionality 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Gene Kavenoki wanted to rent out a room in his apartment to a 
stable person with whom he could get along well.1 Unaware that he 
was engaging in multiple violations of federal law, the graduate 
student posted the following advertisement on Roommates.com: “I 
am not looking for freaks, geeks, prostitutes (male or female), 
druggies, pet cobras, drama, black Muslims or mortgage brokers.”2 
Responding to allegations that he was discriminating on the basis of 
race, Kavenoki explained that he was doing “no such thing,” but was 
instead “discriminating against people who don’t share my slightly 
warped sense of humor.”3  
Although Kavenoki intended only to find a suitable roommate, 
his advertisement violated section 3604(c) of the Fair Housing Act 
(“FHA”) because the language of the advertisement was facially 
discriminatory on both racial and religious grounds.4 While, under 
an exception to the FHA,5 Kavenoki could legally discriminate6—
 
 1. See Adam Liptak, Fair Housing, Free Speech and Choosy Roommates, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 22, 2007, at A12, available at http://select.nytimes.com/2007/01/22/us/22bar.html. 
 2. Id. Various fair-housing councils sued Roommates.com in 2004 alleging that 
Roommates.com was liable under the Fair Housing Act for advertisements, which were similar 
to Kavenoki’s advertisement, placed on Roommates.com’s website. See Fair Hous. Council of 
San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that 
Roommates.com may be liable for a subscriber’s Fair Housing Act violation and remanding the 
case for a judgment on whether Roommates.com violated the Fair Housing Act).  
 3. Liptak, supra note 1. 
 4. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–19 (2006). FHA § 3604(c) states that it is 
unlawful to  
make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published any notice, 
statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that 
indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, 
sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin, or an intention to make any such 
preference, limitation, or discrimination. 
 5. Id. § 3603(b)(2) (stating that the discrimination prohibition in section 3604(c) 
does not apply if “rooms or units in dwellings containing living quarters occupied or intended 
to be occupied by no more than four families living independently of each other, if the owner 
actually maintains and occupies one of such living quarters as his residence”). 
 6. Id.  
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based on race, religion, or any other basis—in his actual roommate 
choice, he could not legally declare his discriminatory intentions or 
criteria in an advertisement.  
Kavenoki’s situation underscores the incongruous effects of the 
FHA on those searching for a roommate: Although someone 
looking for a roommate is making a choice about a person to share 
living spaces and private circumstances, the person looking for a 
roommate may not put personal preferences in a roommate 
advertisement. Additionally, while someone looking for a roommate 
may actually discriminate in making his choice, he may not state his 
“discriminatory” preferences in his advertisement.  
This Comment argues that section 3604(c) of the FHA is 
unconstitutional as applied to roommate choice.7 Specifically, section 
3604(c) is unconstitutional under the First Amendment as embodied 
in the commercial speech doctrine and in the right to freedom of 
intimate association.8 Because real tension exists between anti-
discrimination policies and constitutional rights, Congress and the 
courts must carefully consider how to best accommodate both core 
constitutional rights and important anti-discrimination policies.  
This Comment will first introduce the FHA and the historic 
treatment of the current question in Part II. Part III will argue that 
section 3604(c) of the FHA is unconstitutional under the 
commercial speech doctrine. Part IV will argue that section 3604(c) 
is also unconstitutional under the right to freedom of intimate 
association. Part V will discuss the importance of anti-discrimination 
laws and the costs and benefits of three possible options that attempt 
to accommodate both individual constitutional rights and anti-
discrimination policies. Part VI will provide a brief conclusion.  
 
 7. This Comment uses the term “roommate” but presumes that “roommate” is 
synonymous with “housemate,” “shared living,” and similar terms. 
 8. The unconstitutionality of section 3604(c) can be argued on many other bases. See 
John T. Messerly, Roommate Wanted: The Right to Choice in Shared Living, 93 IOWA L. REV. 
1949 (2008). Messerly considers all of the following as invalidating section 3604(c) in the 
roommate context: the right to privacy, intimate and expressive association, free exercise of 
religion, and freedom of speech. Messerly’s analysis of expressive association (based on the 
assumption that some individuals in shared-living arrangements, such as halfway houses or 
homes for the elderly, consider whether to express a message); free exercise of religion (based 
on the idea that, although facially neutral, housing discrimination laws also violate other 
constitutionally protected freedoms and are therefore also suspect on freedom of religion 
grounds); and freedom of speech are facially and substantively flimsier arguments. 
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II. THE FAIR HOUSING ACT 
The FHA, which has its roots in emotionally charged historical 
practices, contains provisions that put some individuals, including 
those seeking roommates, in a precarious position. While courts have 
generally rejected assertions that portions of the FHA are 
unconstitutional, their rejection is unfounded because these claims 
rest on strong constitutional doctrines and absolutely merit 
attention.  
A. Introduction to the Fair Housing Act 
1. The historical background 
In 1968, Congress enacted the FHA9 in a desperate attempt to 
reduce racial discrimination in housing.10 Although it had been two 
decades since the Supreme Court had found that the enforcement of 
racially discriminatory housing covenants violated the Equal 
Protection Clause,11 racial discrimination in housing was still 
rampant and discrimination had merely retreated to less transparent 
forms.12 For example, mortgage lenders refused to make loans to 
individuals in minority-predominant neighborhoods, loan application 
procedures discouraged minorities, and marketing policies often 
excluded minority areas.13  
In the 1960s, riots in urban areas made the need for change 
blatantly apparent. Trying to understand the urban dynamic, the 
government created the National Advisory Commission on Civil 
Disorders. The Commission’s findings were clear: segregation and 
discrimination were creating “frustrations of powerlessness” that 
 
 9. When Congress first passed fair housing legislation in 1968, the legislation was part 
of the Civil Rights Act. See Civil Rights Act of 1968, § 801–20 (current version at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 3601–19 (2006)). This Comment refers to Congress’s 1968 fair housing legislation and all 
of Congress’s subsequent fair housing legislation as the “Fair Housing Act.” 
 10. Diane J. Klein & Charles Doskow, Housingdiscrimination.com?: The Ninth Circuit 
(Mostly) Puts Out the Welcome Mat for Fair Housing Act Suits Against Roommate-Matching 
Websites, 38 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 329, 339–40 (giving a brief overview of the 
discriminating housing practices of the time). 
 11. Id. at 339; see also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948).  
 12. Klein & Doskow, supra note 10, at 339–40. 
 13. Id.; see also JONATHAN BROWN & CHARLES BENNINGTON, RACIAL REDLINING: A 
STUDY OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION BY BANKS AND MORTGAGE COMPANIES IN THE UNITED 
STATES (1993). 
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contributed significantly to the nationwide disorder.14 The 
Commission suggested that Congress take action to promote 
antidiscrimination, empowerment, and integration. Relying on these 
findings and on a growing certainty that action was necessary to 
prevent further disorder, the Senate passed the FHA on March 14, 
1968.15 
While the FHA waited on House approval, the assassination of 
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., on April 4 added an exclamation mark 
to the warnings of the Commission’s report.16 Following rioting 
across the country, the House passed the FHA on April 10. 
President Johnson signed the FHA into law the next day.17 
2. The Fair Housing Act’s provisions that are relevant to roommate 
selection  
The FHA declares that it is U.S. policy to “provide, within 
constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United 
States.”18 Section 3604 of the FHA originally made it unlawful to 
discriminate in selling or renting due to a prospective buyer’s or 
renter’s “race, color, religion, or national origin.”19 Congress added 
protection of sex in 1974 and protection of familial status and 
handicap in 1988.20  
While the language of the FHA is broad, it provides a few 
exceptions. The most famous of these, the “Mrs. Murphy 
Exception,” allows the owner of housing to discriminate in his 
tenant choice where the owner (1) owns living quarters intended for 
four or fewer families and (2) personally lives in one of the four 
units.21 Individuals seeking a roommate fall into this exception 
 
 14. Brian Patrick Larkin, The Forty-Year “First Step”: The Fair Housing Act as an 
Incomplete Tool for Suburban Integration, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1617, 1621–23 (2007); see 
also John O. Calmore, Race/ism Lost and Found: The Fair Housing Act at Thirty, 52 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 1067, 1068–69 (1998). 
 15. Larkin, supra note 14, at 1623–24; see also Calmore, supra note 14, at 1068–69.  
 16. Larkin, supra note 14, at 1624. 
 17. Id. 
 18. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2006). 
 19. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)–(b) (1976).  
 20. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 109, 
88 Stat. 633 (1974); Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 
1619 (1988). 
 21. See 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2); Bills v. Hodges, 628 F.2d 844, 845 n.1 (4th Cir. 
1980). Although the language of the provision applies only to “owners,” the courts, 
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because they own fewer than four units (or generally do not own any 
units) and live on the premises. Thus, the FHA does not prohibit 
them from discriminating in their roommate choice.  
Regardless of whether an individual fits into the Mrs. Murphy 
Exception and may legally discriminate, the FHA still prohibits 
discriminatory housing statements and advertisements. Specifically, 
section 3604(c) states that an advertisement of, or any intention to 
advertise, a “preference, limitation, or discrimination” based on race, 
color, religion, sex, handicap, or familial status is illegal.22 
Consequently, while a person may legally rent out her basement only 
to a “good Muslim couple” or a “church-going Christian man,” she 
may not indicate this preference in an advertisement.  
B. Courts Generally Hold that Section 3604(c) is Constitutional 
In the forty years since Congress passed the FHA, multiple 
parties have asserted that section 3604(c), in prohibiting housing 
advertisements that indicate discriminatory intent, is 
unconstitutional. In each case, the court dismissed the constitutional 
claims.23 After forty years of accepting the constitutionality of section 
3604(c), it is no surprise that courts and scholars generally view 
claims of unconstitutionality with deep skepticism.24 
 
newspapers, and others involved in fair housing widely recognize that the provision also applies 
to renters or lessees who invite others to live with them as roommates. See Equal Housing 
Covers Roommates Too!, http://www.equalhousingonthenet.com/ (last visited Nov. 2, 
2009); Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity, http://www.wheelerdeeler.com/ 
housing.aspx#roommates (last visited Nov. 2, 2009); LAmarketplace.com, Fair Housing 
Notice: All Roommate/Real Estate Adv., http://la.kaango.com/feViewAd/12630714 (last 
visited Nov. 2, 2009). 
 22. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2006). 
 23. See, e.g., United States v. Space Hunters, Inc., 429 F.3d 416, 425 (2d Cir. 2005); 
Ragin v. N.Y. Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 1002–03 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Hunter, 
459 F.2d 205, 211 (4th Cir. 1972). Most recently, the Ninth Circuit considered this issue in 
Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th 
Cir. 2008). See supra note 2.  
 24. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley, 521 F.3d at 1164; see also Klein & 
Doskow, supra note 10, at 374 (“Such arguments are not especially promising when it comes 
to violations of § 3604(c).”); Jeffrey M. Sussman, Cyberspace: An Emerging Safe Haven for 
Housing Discrimination, 19 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 194, 200 (2007) (providing a similar 
response); Jennifer C. Chang, In Search of Fair Housing in Cyberspace: The Implications of the 
Communications Decency Act for Fair Housing on the Internet, 55 STAN. L. REV. 969, 1006 
(2002) (providing a similar response). But see Posting of Dave Fagundes to PrawfsBlawg, 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/first_amendment/page/2/ (Feb. 15, 2006, 
06:38 AM); Posting of Will Baude to PrawfsBlawg, http://prawfsblawg.blogs. 
DO NOT DELETE 11/19/2009 7:14 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2009 
1346 
Although courts and scholars generally dismiss the idea that 
section 3604(c) is unconstitutional, their reasons are largely 
unfounded and are based in part on the perpetuation of bad law. 
Not only is the commercial speech doctrine incompatible with 
section 3604(c), but the right to freedom of intimate association 
likely also protects roommate choice. The following analysis should 
influence courts and legislatures as they formulate and consider the 
constitutionality of laws that restrict a person’s ability to advertise for 
a roommate.  
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 3604(C) IN LIGHT OF 
THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE 
In a recent case, Judge Easterbrook wrote that “any rule that 
forbids truthful advertising of a transaction that would be 
substantively lawful encounters serious problems under the first 
amendment [sic].”25 Since the FHA was passed in 1968, 
fundamental shifts in the protection of commercial speech have gone 
unrecognized to the extent that they apply to housing 
advertisements. This Part considers developments in the commercial 
speech doctrine and how the courts have ignored these 
developments by perpetuating old law. This Part also argues that 
section 3604(c), which restricts individuals from advertising the 
discriminatory criteria they use in roommate selection, is 
unconstitutional. 
A. The Commercial Speech Doctrine 
Commercial speech is exactly what it sounds like—speech made 
for a commercial purpose and, generally, with the intent of making a 
profit. Advertisements are a classic form of commercial speech. While 
it is now understood that the First Amendment protects commercial 
speech from unwarranted governmental regulation, the Supreme 
Court did not clarify this doctrine until the 1970s. This section will 
consider the great shift in the Supreme Court’s treatment of 
commercial speech, the current test to determine protection and the 
 
com/prawfsblawg/first_amendment/page/2/ (Dec. 1, 2005, 05:05 PM).  
 25. Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 
666, 668 (7th Cir. 2008). 
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policy supporting this test, and the problem of prohibiting speech 
regarding a legal act.  
1. The Supreme Court shifts its view of the commercial speech doctrine 
The Supreme Court’s treatment of commercial speech has 
drastically changed since the early 1970s. For the first century and a 
half of its existence, the Supreme Court did not address commercial 
speech issues; the Court heard its first commercial speech case, 
Valentine v. Chrestensen, in 1942.26 In Valentine, the Court 
differentiated between noncommercial and commercial speech: while 
“freedom of communicating information and disseminating 
opinion” is highly protected under the First Amendment, purely 
commercial speech is not constitutionally protected.27 Under this 
rule, a regulation prohibiting leafleting was constitutionally valid 
because the speech interest was purely commercial.28 
In the mid-1970s, the Court’s stance on this doctrine changed 
significantly. In 1975, the Court held that a Virginia statute making 
it a misdemeanor to prompt the procuring of an abortion was invalid 
as applied to a weekly newspaper that printed an advertisement on 
how and where to get an abortion.29 In addressing the assumption of 
the lower courts that the First Amendment did not protect 
commercial advertisements, the Court stated that “speech is not 
stripped of First Amendment protection merely because it [is] in 
[commercial] form.”30  
One year later, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia 
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,31 the Court clarified the 
commercial speech doctrine: “Advertising, however tasteless and 
excessive it sometimes may seem, is nonetheless dissemination of 
information as to who is producing and selling what product, for 
 
 26. 316 U.S. 52 (1942), overruled by Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 758 (1976).  
 27. Id. at 54. Valentine has since been overruled. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 
466 U.S. 485, 505 n.22 (1984); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 n.6 
(1983). 
 28. Valentine, 316 U.S. at 54–55. 
 29. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 829 (1975). 
 30. Id. at 818 (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Rel. Comm’n, 413 U.S. 376, 384 
(1974); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964)). 
 31. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
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what reason, and at what price.”32 The Court went on to explain: 
“people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well 
enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the 
channels of communication rather than to close them.”33  
2. The modern commercial speech doctrine 
Since 1976, the Supreme Court has continued to clarify the 
extent of First Amendment protection of commercial speech and the 
policy behind this protection. Recognizing that the Constitution 
provides less protection to commercial speech than to other 
expression, the Court in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. 
Public Service Commission of New York laid out the test to determine 
whether the First Amendment protects specific examples of 
commercial speech.34 First, the speech must be legal and not 
misleading—it must inform, rather than deceive, the public.35 
Second, if a regulation restricts commercial speech, then three 
criteria must be met: (1) the government interest in that regulation 
must be substantial; (2) the regulation must directly advance the 
asserted government interest; and (3) the regulation must be 
narrowly tailored to serve that interest.36 
The Supreme Court has also continued to clarify the policy 
behind a limited First Amendment protection of free speech. A 
recurring rationale is that commercial speech is worth protecting 
because it disseminates information and thereby allows people to 
perceive their best interests.37 Additionally, commercial speech is 
“hardier” than other types of expression—it is not “particularly 
susceptible to being crushed by overbroad regulation.”38 Limited 
regulation is appropriate because some forms of advertising such as 
 
 32. Id. at 765. 
 33. Id. at 770. 
 34. 447 U.S. 557, 562–66 (1980). 
 35. Id. at 563–64. 
 36. Id. at 564–66; see also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 505 
(1996). In 44 Liquormart, the Court clarified that bans on “truthful, nonmisleading [sic]” 
commercial speech generally “serve only to obscure an ‘underlying governmental policy’ that 
could be implemented without regulating speech.” 517 U.S. at 502–03 (quoting Cent. 
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 n.9) 
 37. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561–62; see also Linmark Ass’n, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 
U.S. 85, 92 (1977). 
 38. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 n.6 (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 
350, 381 (1977)); 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 485. 
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untruthful or misleading advertisements may exert “undue 
influence” over consumers.39 
3. The modern commercial speech doctrine stands, in part, for the 
premise that legal action equals legal speech 
Today, the commercial speech doctrine additionally stands for 
the premise that while the government may restrict speech about an 
illegal action, it may not restrict speech about a legal action.40 The 
Court, in both Virginia Pharmacy and Central Hudson, advocated 
an approach based on consistency, stating that a state could not 
completely suppress the “dissemination of concededly truthful 
information about entirely lawful activity.”41 In other words, the 
government must be consistent because supporting an act while 
simultaneously disallowing speech regarding that act will almost 
always fail the Central Hudson test. 
While it is clear that the Court in Virginia Board and Central 
Hudson advocated this consistency approach, commentators today 
are occasionally confused by a mid-1980s exception to this 
doctrine.42 In Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Company 
of Puerto Rico, the Court considered the constitutionality of a Puerto 
Rican statute that restricted the advertising of casino gambling to 
Puerto Ricans even though the underlying conduct—gambling—was 
legal.43 The Court reasoned that because the Puerto Rican legislature 
could have prohibited Puerto Rican residents from engaging in 
casino gambling, the legislature necessarily had the lesser power to 
ban advertising of casino gambling.44 
Ten years later, however, in 44 Liquormart, the Supreme Court 
explicitly rejected its Posadas analysis to reaffirm that blanket bans on 
speech about legal actions must be reviewed with “special care” and 
are rarely constitutional.45 Because the ban in Posadas was designed 
to “keep truthful, nonmisleading [sic] speech from members of the 
public” for their protection, the state legislature was engaging in 
 
 39. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 498 (citing Bates, 433 U.S. at 366). 
 40. See id. at 502–03. 
 41. 425 U.S. 748, 773 (1976). 
 42. See, e.g., Posting of Will Baude to PrawfsBlawg, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/ 
prawfsblawg/first_amendment/page/2/ (Dec. 1, 2005, 05:05 PM). 
 43. 478 U.S. 328, 333–34 (1986). 
 44. Id. at 345–46. 
 45. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 485 (citing Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 n.9). 
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inappropriate paternalism.46 The Court rejected the Posadas holding 
and reverted to the “unbroken line of prior cases [which strike] 
down similarly broad regulations on truthful, nonmisleading [sic] 
advertising when non-speech-related alternatives [are] available.”47  
B. The Commercial Speech Doctrine Promotes Free Speech  Concerning 
Legal Actions, Yet Section 3604(c) Prohibits Speech Concerning Lawful 
Advertisements 
Combining the commercial speech doctrine with section 3604(c) 
of the FHA is inherently problematic. Section 3604(c) outlaws 
discriminatory housing advertisements, yet allows discrimination in 
choosing roommates. This situation clearly violates the commercial 
speech doctrine’s premise that the government may not restrict 
speech about a legal action. Consequently, under the commercial 
speech doctrine, section 3604(c) is unconstitutional as it applies to 
those who may lawfully discriminate.  
The following analysis will explain how section 3604(c) became 
unconstitutional; it will likewise address the analytical flaws in the 
post-44 Liquormart cases that have consistently held that section 
3604(c) withstands all First Amendment challenges. This analysis 
will demonstrate how legislators have ignored assertions that section 
3604(c) is unconstitutional as applied to those who may legally 
discriminate. 
1. Before 44 Liquormart, the commercial speech doctrine was 
compatible with section 3604(c) 
When Congress passed the FHA in 1968, the commercial speech 
doctrine and section 3604(c) were not yet incompatible. In 1968, 
the Supreme Court was still operating under its rule from Valentine 
that the First Amendment did not protect commercial speech.48 For 
example, four years after Congress passed the FHA, in United States 
v. Hunter, a newspaper publisher who had violated the FHA by 
advertising a room for rent in a “white home” asked the Fourth 
Circuit Court to overturn section 3604(c) because it violated the 
First Amendment.49 However, the court dismissed the First 
 
 46. Id. at 509–10.  
 47. Id.  
 48. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942). 
 49. 459 F.2d 205, 209, 211 (4th Cir. 1972).  
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Amendment claim after applying the commercial speech doctrine of 
the time. The court reasoned that the publisher had no valid claim 
because the First Amendment did not protect commercial speech.50  
Since Hunter, however, the Supreme Court has fundamentally 
changed the commercial speech doctrine, and commercial speech 
now receives limited constitutional protection.51 Specifically, in 1996 
the Court in 44 Liquormart affirmed that legislation restricting 
speech about a legal action rarely protects consumers and, so long as 
non-speech related alternatives are available, fails the “narrowly 
tailored” prong of the Central Hudson test and is thus 
unconstitutional.52 Because less restrictive alternatives to 3604(c) 
exist—from regulating the publishers of discriminatory materials to 
providing moral or other incentives to nondiscriminatory speech—
the constitutionality of section 3604(c) as applied to those who may 
lawfully discriminate in tenant choice (such as roommates) is highly 
suspect.  
2. Courts have consistently failed to recognize the holding in 44 
Liquormart  
Although the Supreme Court fundamentally changed the 
commercial speech doctrine in 44 Liquormart, courts have not 
recognized how this change affects the constitutionality of section 
3604(c). Courts uniformly reject section 3604(c) challenges based 
on the First Amendment while maintaining that discriminatory 
housing speech, even by those who may legally discriminate, is not 
constitutionally protected.53 Courts generally cite three cases as the 
basis of their rejection of First Amendment challenges to section 
3604(c),54 and each case is faulty and constitutes bad law when 
currently applied to speech regarding roommate choice.  
 
 50. See id. (citing Valentine, 316 U.S. at 54). 
 51. See Part III.A.1.  
 52. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 502–03, 507; see supra notes 39–40 and accompanying 
text. 
 53. See United States v. Space Hunters, Inc., 429 F.3d 416 (2d Cir. 2005); Ragin v. 
N.Y. Times Co., 923 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1991); Hunter, 459 F.2d at 205. For a summary of 
Supreme Court assertions that section 3604(c) does not violate First Amendment protections 
of commercial speech, see William H. Danne, Jr., Annotation, Validity, Construction, and 
Application of § 804(c) of Civil Rights Act of 1968 (Fair Housing Act) (42 U.S.C.A. § 3604(c)) 
Prohibiting Discriminatory Notice, Statement, or Advertisement with Respect to Sale or Rental of 
Dwelling, 142 A.L.R. FED. 1, §§ 20–22 (2008). 
 54. See Danne, supra note 53, at §§ 20–22; see also Hunter, 459 F.2d at 211. 
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First, courts cite United States v. Hunter, the 1972 case that 
cited Valentine to reject a publisher’s assertion that section 3604(c) 
violated his constitutional right to discriminate by including the 
words “white home” in his advertisement.55 However, as discussed 
above, the Hunter decision pre-dated the Court’s decision in 44 
Liquormart; thus, the Hunter decision did not follow the Supreme 
Court’s new interpretation of the commercial speech doctrine. 
Because commercial speech now receives limited protection pursuant 
to 44 Liquormart, Hunter is outdated law.  
Second, courts cite Ragin v. New York Times Co., a 1991 case 
heard in the Second Circuit.56 In Ragin, a group of black prospective 
home purchasers sued the New York Times, alleging that the models 
used in housing advertisements in the newspaper indicated a racial 
preference that violated section 3604(c) of the FHA.57 In response 
to the Times’ claim that section 3604(c) was unconstitutional, the 
Second Circuit found that because housing discrimination was illegal 
the government could regulate “commercial speech related to [that] 
illegal activity.”58  
While Ragin is valid in application to newspapers or those who 
rent or sell multiple dwellings, it is inapplicable in the roommate 
scenario. The New York Times was a large entity that, unlike 
roommates, did not fit under the Mrs. Murphy Exception of section 
3603(b)(2).59 Because the New York Times could not legally 
discriminate, there was no inconsistency in holding that its 
discriminatory speech was unprotected and was illegal under section 
3604(c). This situation contrasts with a scenario where an individual 
(such as one searching for a roommate or a housemate), advertises 
directly because the individual may legally discriminate under the 
Mrs. Murphy Exception. The analysis in Ragin does not apply to 
those advertising for a roommate.  
Third, courts have begun to cite a more recent case, United 
States v. Space Hunters, Inc., in which a housing coordinator who 
operated a housing hotline offensively refused to help a deaf man 
who called the hotline.60 The Second Circuit relied on both Ragin 
 
 55. Hunter, 459 F.2d at 209, 211 (citing Valentine, 316 U.S. at 54). 
 56.  923 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 57. Id. at 998.  
 58. Id. at 1002–03 (internal citations omitted). 
 59. See 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2) (2006). 
 60.  429 F.3d 416 (2d Cir. 2005). 
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and Hunter to state that “[c]ourts have consistently found that 
commercial speech that violates section [3604(c)] is not protected by 
the First Amendment.”61 However, because the court in Space 
Hunters reached its conclusion by relying on the outdated cases of 
Ragin and Hunter, the court in Space Hunters based its holding on 
bad law. 
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 3604(C) IN LIGHT OF 
THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF INTIMATE ASSOCIATION 
In addition to being unconstitutional on commercial speech 
grounds, section 3604(c) is likely also unconstitutional because it 
unduly burdens the right to freedom of intimate association. While 
the precise limits of the right to freedom of intimate association are 
unknown, the Supreme Court has provided some clear examples of 
associations that are protected and that are not protected and has 
clarified both the factors and the policies that help determine 
whether an association is protected. This Part examines this 
framework and argues that based on Supreme Court guidelines, 
precedent, and policies, roommate associations are constitutionally 
protected and that section 3604(c) unconstitutionally burdens 
roommate associations. 
A. The Basics of Intimate Association  
The word “intimate” or “intimacy” may connote a sexual 
relationship; however, the term means much more. Possible 
definitions include “marked by a warm friendship developing 
through long association,”62 “suggesting informal warmth or 
privacy,”63 “closely acquainted,”64 and “having sexual relations.”65 
The word is vague, with possible applications to relationships 
ranging from exclusive clubs to the closeness of a marital 
relationship. 
Just as the word “intimate” is vague, the law regarding the 
constitutional right to freedom of intimate association has its origins 
 
 61. Id. at 425 (citing Ragin, 923 F.2d at 1002–03; United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 
205, 211–13 (4th Cir. 1972)). 
 62. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 656 (11th ed. 2003). 
 63. Id.  
 64. OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS 786 (Am. ed. 2003). 
 65. Id. 
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in one of the “least stable” of constitutional doctrines.66 The 
Supreme Court has never provided an “explicit articulation” on 
which associations are protected;67 however, case law does provide 
some definable limits and guidelines to this doctrine.68 
For example, case law indicates the strength of the intimate-
association right and the applicable standard of review. Where courts 
find a right to freedom of intimate association, the government may 
only intrude upon that right if it provides justification for 
“impairment of the values of intimate association.”69 This standard of 
review depends on where the association falls on a “sliding scale,” 
and thus requires “candid interest balancing.”70 In addition, while 
standards of review may differ, if marital relations or “‘choices 
concerning family living arrangements’” are involved, a reviewing 
court must apply strict scrutiny to determine the validity of the 
regulation.71  
Roberts v. United States Jaycees provides perhaps the most 
comprehensive analysis of the right to intimate association.72 In 
Roberts, the Supreme Court clearly stated that the Bill of Rights, 
particularly the First Amendment, provides “certain kinds of highly 
personal relationships a substantial measure of sanctuary from 
unjustified interference by the state.”73 Thus, the Supreme Court 
protected intimate relationships, which are fundamental and integral 
to liberty and identity, from government intrusion.74  
The right to freedom of intimate association does not extend 
indefinitely. Instead, the Constitution protects only those 
relationships that “by their nature, involve deep attachments and 
commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom 
 
 66. Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 625 
(1980). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 626–27. 
 69. Id. at 627; see also Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 363 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“If 
the State has open to it a less drastic way of satisfying its legitimate interests, it may not choose 
a legislative scheme that broadly stifles the exercise of fundamental personal liberties.” (internal 
citations omitted)). 
 70. Karst, supra note 66, at 628. 
 71. Id. at 627–28 (citing Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) 
(plurality opinion)). 
 72.  468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
 73. Id. at 618. 
 74. See infra Part IV.B.1.a. 
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one shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, 
and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one’s life.”75 
Generally, relationships are protected only where they are 
distinguished by (1) the inclusion of relatively few people, (2) the 
use of “a high degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and 
maintain the affiliation,” and (3) the “seclusion from others in 
critical aspects of the relationship.”76  
B. Limitations on Intimate Association 
While the test that the Supreme Court has provided is relatively 
vague, the Court has provided further limits. Both the policy behind 
the right to freedom of intimate association and case law provide an 
understanding of the murky borders of this right.  
1. Policy and values underlying intimate association and privacy rights  
The policy underlying intimate association generally stems from 
the necessity of protecting the rights of intimate association, the 
historic belief about the sanctity of the home, and the necessity of 
protecting the less intimate relationships in order to protect the 
more intimate relationships. 
a. Emotional enrichment and self-identification. The Supreme 
Court has indicated, at least in part, the policy behind protection of 
intimate association. Specifically, protecting intimate association is 
necessary to provide shelter against government intrusion into 
certain relationships because “individuals draw much of their 
emotional enrichment from close ties with others”77 and because 
“[p]rotecting these relationships from unwarranted state interference 
therefore safeguards the ability independently to define one’s identity 
that is central to any concept of liberty.”78  
Writing on the human need for emotional enrichment, Kenneth 
L. Karst states that a fundamental benefit of intimate association is 
the chance to love and care for another as well as the chance to be 
loved and “to be cared for by another in an intimate association.”79 
Because caring for another requires a “patient effort to know him, 
 
 75. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619–20. 
 76. Id. at 620. 
 77. Id. at 619. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Karst, supra note 66, at 632. 
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trust him, hope for him, and help him develop,” it implies personal 
commitment.80 Just as one person can only have a personal 
commitment to a limited number of people, the time and energy 
required to know and to deal with a whole person “limits the 
number of intimate associations any one person can have.”81 
Similarly, addressing the Supreme Court’s focus in Roberts v. 
United States Jaycees on the human need to “independently . . . 
define one’s identity,”82 Karst explains that it is through intimate 
associations that a person has the best opportunity both to see 
himself and to be seen as “a whole person rather than as an 
aggregate of social roles.”83 Consequently, “[w]hether one’s intimate 
associations be affirming or destructive or both, they have a great 
deal to do with the formation and shaping of an individual’s sense of 
his own identity.”84  
b. Privacy and sanctity of the home. Both natural law and 
constitutional law affirm that an individual has a right to privacy, 
especially within his own home. While the right to freedom of 
intimate association stems from the First Amendment, the right to 
privacy is a fundamental liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.85  
The sanctity of the home is protected because the home is a 
sanctuary where privacy is expected and because most intimate 
associations are centered in the home.86 The Constitution secures to 
a person the freedom to “satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs 
in the privacy of his own home.”87 Consequently, when the 
government intrudes on choices concerning family living 
arrangements, “the usual judicial deference to the legislature is 
inappropriate.”88 In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, for example, the 
 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 634–35. 
 82. 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984). 
 83. Karst, supra note 66, at 635–36. 
 84. Id. at 635. 
 85. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 487 (1965). 
 86. Karst, supra note 66, at 634. 
 87. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (finding that the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments prevent the state from making mere possession of obscene material in 
one’s own home a crime); see also Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 15 (1974) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting).  
 88.  Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (plurality 
opinion). 
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Court found a zoning ordinance that made it illegal for a 
grandmother to live with her two grandsons to be a violation of due 
process.89 Further, a whole line of other cases recognize that there 
exists a “private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.”90  
c. Protecting short-lived relationships protects durable-intimate 
relationships. The Supreme Court has never specifically stated the 
principal that, in order to protect deep, emotionally-enriching 
relationships, some short-term or casual relationships must 
necessarily be protected as well; however, this rule is implicit.  
Not all marital relationships are deep and enriching, and many 
are quite short—however, all are protected; similarly, some family 
members merely cohabitate rather than emotionally enrich each 
other—yet they are protected. The protection provided to these 
relationships suggests that the right to intimate association protects 
some short-term relationships (at least those that occur in the home) 
where those relationships have the potential to become “durable 
intimate associations.”91 “To mandate that constitutional protection 
should extend only to cases of prolonged commitment requires 
‘intolerable inquiries’ into extremely private, subjective feelings and 
states of mind.”92  
2. Limits provided by the Supreme Court  
In addition to providing a theoretical guide to determine 
protected associations, the Supreme Court has set some clear limits 
through case law. These limits help guide analysis. 
a. The clearly not protected relationships and the clearly protected 
relationships. Case law provides some clear cases of associations that 
are not protected. Membership in a club of large membership is not 
protected;93 dance-hall patrons94 and participants in one-night stands 
in motels95 are likewise not protected in their associations. These 
 
 89. Id. at 506. 
 90. Id. at 499 (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)). 
 91. Karst, supra note 66, at 633; see also Messerly, supra note 8, at 1967. 
 92. Messerly, supra note 8, at 1949 (quoting Karst, supra note 66, at 633). 
 93. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 545–47 (1987) (based on 
size of the clubs, the “inclusive” purpose, and the lack of limits on membership). 
 94. City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 24 (1989) (“It is clear beyond cavil that 
dance-hall patrons, who may number 1,000 on any given night, are not engaged in the sort of 
‘intimate human relationships’ referred to in Roberts.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 95. FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 237 (1990) (“Any ‘personal bonds’ 
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associations are not sufficiently selective, exclusive, or limited in size. 
They also have little likelihood of developing into deep, enriching 
relationships. 
Similarly, the Supreme Court has identified clear examples of 
protected associations. The right to freedom of intimate association 
protects marital associations,96 associations between parent and child 
(through the begetting and bearing of children and “child rearing 
and education”),97 and associations between cohabiting relatives.98 
Similarly, the right to liberty and privacy under the Due Process 
Clause protects those engaged in private sexual conduct.99 
Consequently, the government may not intrude into these 
relationship choices without first finding that the proposed 
legislation passes strict scrutiny.100  
The Supreme Court has also provided guidelines on what might 
be protected. As the Supreme Court stated in Roberts, associations in 
a marital relationship are clearly protected and those in a “large 
business enterprise” are clearly not protected.101 However, between 
the two lies “a broad range of human relationships that may make 
greater or lesser claims to constitutional protection from particular 
incursions by the State.”102 Determination of whether a relationship 
is protected depends on where it falls on the spectrum of intimacy. 
Relevant factors may include “size, purpose, policies, selectivity,” 
and other pertinent characteristics.103 
b. Aside from the clearly protected and the clearly not protected 
relationships, it is difficult to analyze whether a relationship is 
protected. For all cases falling somewhere in the middle of the 
 
that are formed from the use of a motel room for fewer than 10 hours are not those that have 
‘played a critical role in the culture and traditions of the Nation by cultivating and transmitting 
shared ideals and beliefs.’” (internal citations omitted)). 
 96. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383–86 (1978). 
 97. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684–86 (1977); see also Pierce v. 
Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925). 
 98. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503–04 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
 99. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003).  
 100. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 634 (1984); see also Elrod v. Burns, 427 
U.S. 347, 363 (1976) (“If the State has open to it a less drastic way of satisfying its legitimate 
interests, it may not choose a legislative scheme that broadly stifles the exercise of fundamental 
personal liberties.” (internal citations omitted)); Karst, supra note 66, at 628. 
 101. 468 U.S. at 620.  
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
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intimacy spectrum, the analysis of constitutionality is blurry at best. 
Although the Supreme Court has explicitly stated that it has not 
limited protection to relationships between family members,104 the 
Court has not provided specific guidelines as to what other 
relationships qualify for protection.  
Working their way across this blurry ground, courts have sent a 
contradictory message in regard to associations outside the realm of 
the family or of sexual intimates.105 For example, in Berrios v. State 
University of New York at Stony Brook, a federal district court 
examined a case where both a man’s wife and his work colleague 
claimed a right to freedom of intimate association with him.106 The 
court in Berrios found that where the relationship “falls outside of 
the familial arena,” it is not protected.107 
Despite the tendency of some lower courts to narrowly interpret 
intimate association, plentiful evidence suggests that the right to 
freedom of intimate association should be interpreted more broadly. 
First, the Supreme Court, in contrast to the court in Berrios, has 
never held that intimate association protection is limited to familial 
relationships.108 Instead, the Supreme Court has held that 
attachment, commitment, and sharing within the relationship qualify 
an association for protection.109  
Additionally, several Supreme Court Justices have affirmed that 
intimate associations apply outside a familial relationship. The 
Supreme Court in United States Department of Agriculture v. 
Moreno explicitly considered the validity of legislation that penalized 
unrelated people living as a single household.110 While the majority 
determined that the legislation was invalid due to the lack of a 
rational basis in the classification,111 Justice Douglas in his concurring 
opinion affirmed that the choice of one’s associates, including those 
with whom one lives, is “basic in our constitutional scheme.”112 
 
 104. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987). 
 105. Berrios v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Stony Brook, 518 F. Supp. 2d 409, 418 (E.D.N.Y. 
2007) (“Where, however, the relationship sought to be protected falls outside of the familial 
arena, it has been held to be not similarly protected.”).  
 106. Id. at 420–21. 
 107. Id. at 418. 
 108. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 545; see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 109. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 545.  
 110. 413 U.S. 528 (1973). 
 111. Id. at 533–38. 
 112. Id. at 541 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
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According to Justice Douglas, freedom of association is broad 
enough to encompass the “right to invite the stranger into one’s 
home.”113 “Taking a person into one’s home because he is poor or 
needs help or brings happiness to the household is of the same 
dignity” as the marital right to privacy or other rights of intimate 
association that the Supreme Court has recognized.114  
In addition, Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opinion in Village 
of Belle Terre v. Boraas echoed Justice Douglas’ reasoning and 
statements to find that a zoning restriction that prohibited a group 
of students from living together should be invalid.115 
Most recently, in Lawrence v. Texas,116 the Supreme Court 
expanded protection of intimate associations beyond the familial 
arena. In Lawrence, the Supreme Court invalidated a Texas law that 
prohibited certain homosexual acts.117 The Court reasoned that 
Lawrence was about far more than homosexual sex, it was about the 
liberty of people to choose and conduct their personal relationships 
in their own homes without being labeled and punished as 
criminals.118 The Court recognized that sexuality is only “one 
element in a personal bond” of intimacy; additionally, adults have 
the right to this bond “in the confines of their homes” and in “their 
own private lives.”119 The Court thereby indicated an expanded idea 
of protection of associations beyond the family, beyond sex, and 
between those who choose to live together.  
C. Application in the Roommate and Housemate Scenario 
The above factors and policy considerations combine for a strong 
case in favor of recognizing the constitutional protection of 
roommate choice and advertisements furthering that choice. 
Roommate associations meet the Supreme Court’s factor test to 
determine protection; additionally, the policies and values underlying 
 
 113. Id. at 543; see also Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 18 (1974) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (stating that the freedom of association is broad enough to encompass the “‘right 
to invite the stranger into one’s home’ not only for ‘entertainment’ but to join the household 
as well” (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 438–45)).  
 114. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 542 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 115. 416 U.S. at 18 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 116. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 117. Id. at 562. 
 118. Id. at 567. 
 119. Id.  
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intimate association support the premise that roommate associations 
are valuable and merit constitutional protection.  
1. Analyzing roommate situations under the Supreme Court’s 
protection analysis  
The Supreme Court has clearly expressed protection of 
relationships that “by their nature, involve deep attachments and 
commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom 
one shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, 
and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one’s life.”120 
Because this test is vague, the Supreme Court has provided a list of 
factors to consider: (1) small size, (2) high selectivity, (3) exclusion 
of others from “critical aspects” of the relationship, and (4) the 
purpose of the association.121  
a. Size. Roommate and housemate situations meet the size 
consideration. By necessity, roommate and housemate size is limited 
by the number of people that will fit under one roof. Thus, the 
number of roommates approximates the number of individuals in a 
family, and the number of people involved can easily be 
distinguished from the number involved in a large club or other 
impersonal association.122  
b. High selectivity. It is probable that many persons seeking 
roommates will screen scores of applicants. Meanwhile others, 
despite financial strain, will go months without a roommate while 
searching for someone who possesses the qualities that they desire.  
This selectivity process is not generally as extensive as that which 
goes into choosing a partner in marriage. However, on the spectrum 
of selectivity, the selectivity that goes into choosing with whom to 
live may be second only to marriage and long-term sexual 
relationships.  
Occasionally, roommate selection is based on less than this high 
degree of selectivity. For example, in short-term arrangements, 
individuals seeking roommates will likely be able to tolerate the 
presence of some roommates they would not seek for the long-term. 
Additionally, individuals may exercise a lower degree of selectivity 
where finances are pressing and an immediate roommate is necessary 
 
 120. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619–20 (1984). 
 121. Id. at 620. 
 122. Id. 
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or in dormitory situations where a university board may make the 
selections. However, it is likely that most people will fear the 
negative repercussions of a negative roommate experience and will 
exercise a high amount of selectivity in roommate choice. 
c. Exclusion. Roommate scenarios are likely sufficiently 
“exclusive” in “critical aspects of the relationship”123 to meet this 
part of the factor test. “Exclusive” means simply that others are not 
privy to or invited to participate in certain elements.124 Additionally, 
because freedom of intimate association extends to those not 
involved in a sexual relationship,125 “critical aspects” clearly involves 
something more general.  
Cases in which a court has upheld constitutional protection of a 
relationship generally involve a relationship within the privacy of the 
home.126 In sharing the privacy of a home, household members are 
necessarily exclusive in their relationships, in their financial 
discussions, in their arguments, in their personal knowledge of each 
other’s personal habits, and more. Finding that exclusivity is met 
where a small number of individuals live in a common household 
accords with the Supreme Court’s statement that intimate 
association protects relationships with the few with whom one shares 
“thoughts, experiences, . . . beliefs, . . . [and] distinctively personal 
aspects of one’s life.”127  
d. Purpose of the association. While “purpose of the association” is 
also a vague factor, it is likely that roommate scenarios meet it. While 
the Supreme Court has declined to explicitly define this term, it is 
likely that the Supreme Court is indicating that intimate association 
is not meant to protect relationships with a casual purpose—
constitutional protection should extend only to purposes involving 
“deep attachments and commitments.”128 Because of this, the 
Supreme Court has found a lack of protection where the purpose is 
 
 123. Id.; see also Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987). 
 124. MERRIAM-WEBSTER, supra note 62, at 436. 
 125. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684–86 (1977); Pierce v. Soc’y 
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925). 
 126. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383–86 (1978); Carey, 431 U.S. at 
684–86; Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503–04 (1977) (plurality opinion); 
Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534–35. 
 127. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619–20. 
 128. Id. at 620. 
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general society (such as in clubs)129 or sexual relations alone.130 Not 
only are relationships with club members or prostitutes fleeting and 
often shallow, but these relationships have a very low likelihood of 
ever developing into a deep attachment worthy of protection.  
Accordingly, it seems likely that the right to freedom of intimate 
association protects relationships that indicate the inherent potential 
to develop into deep attachments. Associations with those with 
whom one shares living space and to whom one will likely turn for 
emotional support, constant society, and emergency help likely have 
a sufficiently intimate purpose to warrant protection. 
2. Protecting roommate associations supports the policies underlying 
intimate association 
Just as the associations of roommates seem to meet the Supreme 
Court’s factor tests that determine protection, the policies and values 
underlying intimate association support the premise that roommate 
associations are of sufficient value to merit constitutional protection. 
Specifically, the fundamental values inherent in protected 
relationships, the sanctity of the home, and protection of the possibly 
short-term in order to protect the long-term all support extending 
the right to freedom of intimate association to roommate 
associations. 
a. Emotional enrichment and self-identification. Roommate 
scenarios provide sources of emotional enrichment. While some 
roommates will admittedly share the kitchen and nothing more, 
many other roommate relationships will develop into close 
friendships and support systems. So long as roommates get beyond 
shallow initial relationships, they will try to know, trust, hope for, 
and help each other where possible.131 Due to close quarters and 
emotional and social ties, another roommate’s well-being often 
becomes the deep concern of all inhabitants. Emotional enrichment 
is provided as other roommates take “the trouble to know him and 
deal with him as a whole person, not just as the occupant of a 
role.”132  
 
 129. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 546–47 (1987). 
 130. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 237 (1990). 
 131. Karst, supra note 66, at 632. 
 132. Id. at 634. 
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Regardless of the relationship between them, roommates see 
each other with their defenses down, in pajamas, doing quirky or 
lazy things. In other words, inside the home individuals engage in 
behaviors that are often hidden from the public. Therefore, because 
roommates experience each other’s personal circumstances and 
behaviors, each roommate’s opinion and affirmation may be highly 
important. Consequently, “[t]he choice of household companions—
of whether a person’s ‘intellectual and emotional needs’ are best met 
by living with family, friends, professional associates, or others”133—
requires deep and personal deliberation. The right to freedom of 
intimate association is intended to protect precisely these values.  
b. Privacy and sanctity of the home. The privacy doctrine, relying 
heavily on the sanctity of the home, makes no distinction between 
those who live within the walls of the home. This doctrine provides a 
haven and recognizes the natural right to establish a home and 
choose with whom one associates within its walls. 
Additionally, because roommate relationships often substitute for 
family relationships, the roommate relationship is traditionally 
protected under privacy doctrine. Privacy doctrine protects not just 
the home, but also “the life which characteristically has its place in 
the home.”134 Just as family members ideally meet a person’s 
“intellectual and emotions needs” as a child, an adult makes the 
choice as to who will best meet her needs—family, friends, 
coworkers, or others.135 These decisions determine “the kind and 
quality of intimate relationships within the home.”136 Consequently, 
these decisions involve the personal and emotional considerations 
that form the right to privacy protected by the Constitution.  
c. Protecting the short-term to protect the long-term. While some 
roommates do share enduring emotional attachments, others merely 
share a kitchen and may only see each other in passing. However, 
marital and family relationships are constitutionally protected not 
because they are necessarily intimate but because they are located 
within the privacy of the home and have the potential to become 
 
 133. Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 16 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973)).  
 134. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504 n.12 (1977) (plurality opinion) 
(citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
 135. See Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 16 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
 136. Id. 
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intimate relationships.137 While not all roommate relationships will 
have the same depth and commitment as these familial relationships, 
the possibility (and modicum of likelihood) of intimacy requires 
protection. 
3. The Supreme Court’s decision in Belle Terre  
The Supreme Court’s analysis in a 1974 case, Village of Belle 
Terre v. Boraas, initially seems contrary to an assertion that 
roommate associations are constitutionally protected. However, the 
Court’s holding in Belle Terre and protection of roommate intimate 
association rights can peacefully coexist.  
In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, a group of six unrelated 
students moved into a Long Island house that was zoned to prevent 
more than two unrelated people from living together.138 After 
villagers raised a complaint, the case went all the way to the Supreme 
Court, which upheld the zoning ordinance as rationally related to 
the purpose of the ordinance.139 The Court disregarded the students’ 
claim to freedom of association.140  
Justice Marshall, however, provided a well-reasoned dissenting 
opinion stating that the zoning ordinance “burdens the students’ 
fundamental rights of association and privacy guaranteed by the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments.”141 According to Justice Marshall’s 
rationale, while the policies behind the ordinance were valid, the city 
could have upheld its policies without sacrificing the students’ 
constitutional rights.142  
In finding that Justice Marshall was correct in stating that the 
right to freedom of intimate association protects roommate 
associations, a court need not find that zoning laws that restrict 
occupancy (such as the zoning laws in Belle Terre) are 
unconstitutional. While the students in Belle Terre could not live in 
the village of Belle Terre, they could still live together because the 
zoning law restricted only the “where,” but not the “how” or “with 
whom.”  
 
 137. Karst, supra note 66, at 634. 
 138. Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 2–3. 
 139. Id. at 7–8. 
 140. Id. at 8–9. 
 141. Id. at 13 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 142. Id. at 18. 
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Conversely, restrictions on housing advertisements can make it 
impossible for an individual who is seeking specific requirements in a 
roommate to find such a person. While these distinctions may 
initially seem minor, the result may be monumental: the Belle Terre 
students could easily find a place with different zoning regulations 
where they could live together as they desired; however, an 
individual seeking a roommate may be completely unable to legally 
find and establish a home—anywhere—with a person who meets her 
qualifications.143 Because the burden on those unable to advertise 
their criteria is far heavier than the burden on those who are simply 
restricted from certain neighborhoods, advertising restrictions are far 
more constitutionally suspect.  
D. Section 3604(c) Substantially Burdens the Right               to 
Intimate Association 
As the above section demonstrates, the right to freedom of 
intimate association affords individuals the substantive right to 
discriminate in actual choice of roommate; however, it is still possible 
to argue that the government may both recognize this substantive 
right and simultaneously burden this right by prohibiting 
discriminatory advertisements. In this line of analysis, so long as the 
substantive right is preserved, partial regulation is valid; additionally, 
because commercial speech is subject to a lower level of protection, 
the government is particularly free to regulate commercial housing 
speech.144 However, while the government may regulate to an 
extent, laws prohibiting individuals from advertising for a roommate 
are excessively burdensome and invalid.  
The Supreme Court has established that a law that imposes a 
direct and substantial burden on an intimate relationship is subject to 
strict scrutiny; alternatively, if a law does not impose a direct and 
substantial burden, it is subject only to rational basis review.145 
Consequently, if section 3604(c) does not amount to a direct and 
substantial burden on intimate association, it is almost certainly valid 
under rational basis review. Government action is considered to place 
a direct and substantial burden where “a large portion of those 
 
 143. See infra Part IV.D. 
 144. E.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 
557, 564 (1980). 
 145. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383–87 (1978). 
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affected by the rule are absolutely or largely prevented from [forming 
intimate associations],” or where “those affected by the rule are 
absolutely or largely prevented from [forming intimate associations] 
with a large portion of [people with whom they could form intimate 
associations].”146 
Under this test, government prohibition of discriminatory 
housing advertisements amounts to a “direct and substantial 
burden.” Although other avenues exist to find a suitable 
roommate—such as word of mouth or posting a non-discriminatory 
advertisement and then discriminating in practice—public 
advertisements are often essential. Consequently, by limiting the 
legal means of finding a suitable roommate, section 3604(c) 
substantially burdens roommate associations from forming with a 
“large portion” of the roommate pool.147 
The fact that 3604(c) burdens only commercial speech does not 
change the “substantial burden” analysis. While the Constitution 
gives lowered protection to commercial speech, the rationale for 
lowered protection is unsound when applied to roommate 
advertisements.148 Commercial speech is accorded less protection 
largely because commercial speakers “have extensive knowledge of 
both the market and their products” and can easily “evaluate . . . the 
lawfulness of the underlying activity.”149 Additionally, because 
commercial speakers are motivated by “economic self-interest,” 
commercial speech is considered “hard[ier]” than other types of 
expression—it is not “particularly susceptible to being crushed by 
overbroad regulation.”150  
Individuals seeking roommates are distinctly different from the 
supposed commercial speaker. First, these individuals are generally 
unfamiliar with the housing market and housing laws. They are 
motivated in part by economic self-interest, but their desire for a 
comfortable living situation generally far outweighs economic 
interest. The speech of these individuals is not “hardier” than other 
speech—it is often particularly susceptible to overbroad regulations.  
 
 146. Anderson v. City of LaVergne, 371 F.3d 879, 882 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Vaughn 
v. Lawrenceburg Power Sys., 269 F.3d 703, 710 (6th Cir. 2001).  
 147. Anderson, 371 F.3d at 882. 
 148. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564. 
 149. Id. at 564 n.6 (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 381 (1977)). 
 150. Id. (quoting Bates, 433 U.S. at 381); see also Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. 
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771–72 n.24 (1976). 
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V. POSSIBLE OPTIONS THAT BALANCE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION 
LAWS AND CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES 
While the last decades have seen vast improvement in tolerance 
and acceptance, discrimination based on race, religion, handicap, and 
other factors continues to be a significant issue in this country. 
Consequently, Congress and the courts face a hard decision—decide 
whether to maintain the status quo, find a way to uphold 3604(c) 
while still upholding the First Amendment, or adopt a narrow 
exception to section 3604(c)’s ban on discriminatory advertising. 
A. The Immediate Objection: Discrimination is Real 
There is no doubt about it, discrimination remains a pertinent 
issue in the United States. While incidences of discrimination against 
minorities have decreased significantly in the last several decades,151 
discrimination continues.152 While other aspects of the civil rights 
laws are deeply entrenched in society today, housing remains an area 
that is “uniquely intractable”153—noncompliance remains 
common.154 
Much of this discrimination is institutional, hidden in financing 
procedures and insurance practices;155 some of it, however, occurs in 
blatant form, both in practice and in discriminatory advertisements. 
Some advertisements discriminate in bizarre ways that may amaze 
 
 151. Margery Austin Turner, Limits on Housing and Neighborhood Choice: Discrimination 
and Segregation in U.S. Housing Markets, 41 IND. L. REV. 797, 799 (2008). According to 
HUD reports, discrimination incidents against African-American renters declined from 26% in 
1989 to 22% in 2000. Id. Blacks are now more likely to be told about the same number of 
available units as comparable white renters. Id. In sales, discrimination against African-
Americans is down from 29% in 1989 to 17%, while discrimination against Hispanics decreased 
from 27% to 20% during that time period. Id. Both minority groups are likely to be told about 
the same number of available homes as whites are likely to be told. Id. 
 152. See, e.g., id. While discrimination against African-Americans is decreasing, 
discrimination against Hispanics remained essentially unchanged from 1989 to 2000; 
additionally, Hispanic renters are now more likely to be quoted a higher rent compared to 
non-Hispanic whites. Id.  
 153. Robert G. Schwemm, Why Do Landlords Still Discriminate (And What Can Be Done 
About It)?, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 455, 460 (2007). 
 154. Id. at 459; see also Turner, supra note 151, at 799–800.  
 155. See, e.g., Larkin, supra note 14, at 1640–41 (outlining institutionalized practices 
such as steering, lack of assistance with financing by real estate brokers, mortgage lending 
practices, and housing insurance practices that affect the racial makeup of a neighborhood); see 
also Turner, supra note 151, at 800–03. For a discussion on the gentrification of suburban 
cities, see also Calmore, supra note 14, at 1068, 1107. 
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rather than offend a reader: “‘We are 3 Christian females who Love 
our Lord Jesus Christ. . . . We have weekly bible studies and bi-
weekly times of fellowship,’”156 or “‘The female we are looking for 
hopefully wont [sic] mind having a little sexual incounter [sic] with 
my boyfriend and I.’ [sic]”157  
However, other discriminatory ads may be harsh or derogatory, 
whether on racial, religious, family, or other grounds. For example, 
actual online postings cited in recent cases include the following: 
“NO MINORITIES,”158 “NOT looking for black muslims [sic],” no 
“smokers, kids or druggies,” “MUST be a BLACK GAY MALE,”159 
and “No children.”160 
This discrimination may harm society in many ways. Robert Post 
has identified three types of harm that discriminatory speech, 
including advertisements, creates.161 First and most obviously, racist 
expression harms individuals through feelings of “humiliation, 
isolation, and self-hatred.”162 This is especially true where expression 
is delivered in public or by a person or entity in a powerful or 
authoritative position.163 Second, discriminatory speech hurts “those 
groups that are the target of the expression.”164 Finally, 
discriminatory speech creates “deontic harm” as society recognizes 
the “elemental wrongness” of this expression.165  
B. Possible Options 
Because the Constitution and anti-discrimination policies are 
both highly significant, Congress and the courts will undoubtedly 
face many thorny issues as they address the constitutionality of 
section 3604(c). It is unnecessary to throw out either the 
 
 156. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 
1157, 1173 n.35 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 157. Id. at 1173 n.34. 
 158. Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 
666, 668 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 159. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1173. 
 160. Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 668. 
 161. Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 267, 271–77 (1991) (quoted in Klein & Doskow, supra note 10, at 347). 
 162. Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and 
Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 137 (1982). 
 163. Id. at 143. 
 164. Post, supra note 161, at 273–74. 
 165. Id. at 272. 
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Constitution or the FHA; instead, Congress and the courts should 
accommodate the values inherent in both by carefully considering 
the costs and benefits of various options. The following outlines 
three possible options that attempt to balance constitutional values 
and anti-discrimination laws. 
1. Option A: Ignore the unconstitutionality of section 3604(c) and 
maintain the status quo 
Because the Constitutional doctrines are complex and anti-
discrimination policies are highly important, Congress and the courts 
may prefer to continue ignoring the unconstitutionality of 3604(c) 
in the roommate scenario. This option carries both possible benefits 
and negative ethical ramifications.  
For example, there are benefits to having stringent laws that are 
leniently enforced. Constitutional law and anti-discrimination laws 
are two powerful and important interests; where these laws converge 
and oppose each other, strict anti-discrimination laws that are 
sometimes leniently enforced may relieve some of the tension.166 
Additionally, because facially stiff laws often carry a “moral force,” 
lenient enforcement may be sufficient—even if actual enforcement is 
relatively relaxed, the moral force of strict laws can influence 
behavior.167 Consequently, people may be more likely to obey the 
law, and any lenity when they do not obey is unexpected and 
generally not widely known.  
This method describes the status quo. Discriminatory housing 
advertisements are rampant on the Internet,168 and individuals who 
post discriminatory housing ads in violation of section 3604(c) are 
seldom prosecuted.169 It may be that individuals seeking roommates 
are simply seldom “worth” suing, but suing Roommate.com or 
Craigslist may be more effective.170 However, it is also likely that the 
 
 166. See WARD FARNSWORTH, THE LEGAL ANALYST: A TOOLKIT FOR THINKING ABOUT 
THE LAW 184 (2007). 
 167. See id. at 185. 
 168. For examples, look on any online classifieds or search “roommate” to find 
roommate websites. Almost every site with housing ads will contain multiple discriminatory 
statements. 
 169. But see infra note 172 for exceptions. 
 170. See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 
1157 (9th Cir. 2008); Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, 
Inc., 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008). 
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Department of Housing and Urban Development consciously 
recognizes that it may be better off not strictly enforcing section 
3604(c).171  
Despite the possible benefits of maintaining section 3604(c) 
while leniently applying it, continuing with the status quo is ethically 
problematic. First, this option ignores the Constitution by 
continuing to allow section 3604(c) to abrogate the constitutional 
rights of those who should have recourse and protection. While 
many who advertise their discriminatory requirements as they search 
for an appropriate roommate never discover that this speech is illegal, 
some are prosecuted and forced to pay remedies.172 These individuals 
suffer in time, expense, and headache the costs of ignoring these 
constitutional issues. Similarly, maintaining strict laws that are 
loosely enforced hurts those who know the actual law and who wish 
to abide by it. While these individuals may have a constitutional right 
to advertise as they like for a roommate, a desire to be a law-abiding 
citizen and the fear of consequences of breaking the law may prevent 
these individuals from exercising their constitutional rights.  
Second, this option does not uphold the integrity of law. Most 
individuals seeking roommates are unaware that the law prohibits 
them from posting discriminatory housing advertisements; as they 
eventually discover that this law exists, they may be unable to 
reconcile this law with their own experiences. They may possibly 
conclude that the government is not serious about its anti-
discrimination laws—in housing or at all. By maintaining 
unconstitutional strict laws and by declining to enforce these laws, 
courts may taint public perception of the entire legal scheme.  
 
 171. See 24 C.F.R. § 109.20(b)(5) (1994) (withdrawn). 24 C.F.R. pt. 109(b)(5), laying 
forth HUD policy, formerly stated that advertisements indicating that the housing was 
available only to persons of a single sex were invalid; however, this section did not apply 
“where the sharing of living areas” was involved. While this regulation was withdrawn in 1996, 
it likely continues to reflect HUD’s enforcement policy. National Fair Housing Advocate 
Online, 24 C.F.R. 109.20 Use of words, phrases, symbols, and visual aids, http://www. 
fairhousing.com/index.cfm?method=page.display&pagename=regs_fhr_109-20 (last visited 
Nov. 2, 2009). 
 172. See, e.g., State ex rel Sprague v. City of Madison, 205 Wis. 2d 110 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1996) (review of case requiring roommates who discriminated against another woman to pay 
almost $30,000 in attorney’s fees and compensatory and punitive damages); Dep’t of Fair 
Employment and Hous. v. De Santis, FEHC Dec. No. 02-12, 2002 WL 1313078 (Cal. 
F.E.H.C. 2002) (case in which a woman was sued after she admitted to a housing “tester” that 
she was scared to live with a black man); see also Messerly, supra note 8, at 1958. 
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2. Option B: Uphold section 3604(c) without disregarding the First 
Amendment 
A second option is for Congress and the courts to fully uphold 
3604(c) while still upholding the First Amendment. The courts 
could do this by narrowly reading the right to freedom of intimate 
association and by creating an exception to the commercial speech 
doctrine. 
 a. Narrow interpretation of intimate association rights. Courts 
may narrowly interpret the right to freedom of intimate association 
by finding that this right exists only within familial and sexual 
relationships. This limit would continue to uphold past findings of 
intimate association rights173 but would curtail expansion that would 
protect unrelated adults who platonically cohabitate.  
This interpretation would mesh well with some lower-court 
decisions;174 however, it would also require a substantive withdrawal 
from the Supreme Court’s rationale and rules as articulated in 
Roberts v. United States Jaycees.175 Specifically, this interpretation 
would ignore the policy of protecting relationships that afford deep 
emotional enrichment and identity;176 the current test of protecting 
based on size, selectivity, exclusion;177 and the assurance that 
protection may extend beyond family.178 It would additionally rest 
on some arbitrary limits.179  
b. Finding an exception under the commercial speech doctrine. 
Courts may create an exception to the commercial speech doctrine 
that allows them to both uphold the constitutionality of 3604(c) and 
retain the commercial speech doctrine without much alteration. In 
response to increased realization of the constitutional dilemma that 
 
 173. See supra Part III.B.2.a.  
 174. See, e.g., Berrios v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Stony Brook, 518 F. Supp. 2d 409 
(E.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 175. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984). 
 176. Id. at 619; see also Citizens for Equal Protection, Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 
980, 992 (D. Neb. 2005). 
 177. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620. 
 178. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987). 
 179. For example, this Author currently lives with two roommates. She and roommate A 
grew up in the same hometown and went to the same high school. She met roommate B only 
recently; after roommate B moved in with her, she discovered that she and roommate B are 
distant cousins. An arbitrary familial protection might protect the more casual short-term 
relationship with roommate B while not protecting the relationship with roommate A. 
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section 3604(c) and commercial speech doctrine create, academics 
have begun to theorize how section 3604(c) may still be 
constitutional.180 They offer theories that would create only minor 
changes to the constitutional speech doctrine while also finding that 
individuals who may legally discriminate in roommate choice may 
still not advertise their discriminatory criteria. 
The most plausible theory suggests that 44 Liquormart should 
stand for the requirement that the government must “articulate a 
unified rationale with respect to regulated subject matter” and that 
the government may not enact schizophrenic legislation.181 Under 
this interpretation, where “speech about the activity creates a harm 
that is distinct from permitting the activity itself,”182 the government 
may be able to restrict commercial speech about a legal activity 
because the speech “creates an analytically separate warrant for its 
restriction.”183  
The legal community is likely to accept this interpretation. First, 
it appears to square, at least in part, with Supreme Court analysis. In 
Virginia Pharmacy, the Court attacked a statute intended to protect 
the public for supposedly harmful information. Criticizing the statute 
as paternalistic, the Court stated that it was determined “to assume” 
that the information was not harmful.184 By presenting evidence of a 
separate harm that discriminatory speech creates, courts supporting 
this theory may rebut the Supreme Court’s assumption of a lack of 
harm and thereby create an exception to the commercial speech 
doctrine.  
Several scholars have posited that discriminatory housing 
advertisements create social harms that differ from the harms that 
actual discrimination creates, and the most forceful arguments state 
that discriminatory speech creates psychic damage separate from the 
damage inflicted by the act of discrimination. Unannounced 
discrimination in actual choice of roommates may hurt those actually 
searching for housing, but may not affect the general public;185 in 
 
 180. See also Klein & Doskow, supra note 10, at 375. See generally http://prawfsblawg. 
blogs.com/prawsblawg/first_amendment/, (Feb. 15, 2006 and Dec. 1, 2005).  
 181. Posting of Dave Fagundes to Prawfsblawg, supra note 24.  
 182. Id.  
 183. Id. 
 184. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
770 (1976). 
 185. Posting of Dave Fagundes to Prawfsblawg, supra note 24. 
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contrast, discriminatory advertisements may “generate interethnic 
animosity and social divisiveness.”186 The Second Circuit, in United 
States v. Space Hunters, Inc., supported this rationale while saying 
that section 3604(c) was intended to “protect[] against the psychic 
injury,” which discriminatory housing statements create.187 In the 
same way that “[e]very person of color who ever walked by a 
restaurant, motel, restroom, or water fountain with a sign reading 
WHITES ONLY was damaged by that experience even if he or she 
had no occasion to enter the restaurant, motel, or restroom, or drink 
from the fountain,”188 the case may be made that every person who 
sees a discriminatory housing advertisement—regardless of whether 
he is searching for housing and being discriminated against—is 
damaged.  
While psychic harm is undoubtedly real and problematic, the 
analysis of separate harms will always come down to semantics—the 
fact that this proposed rule may be easily manipulated toward an 
end. It is possible to say that discriminatory action creates a direct 
harm and that discriminatory speech creates a wider harm—and that 
these harms differ, but it is just as possible to say that these harms are 
the same—whether a person directs the harm toward a single person 
or more generally, he is creating likely divisiveness and hurt. 
Because these harms are difficult to measure and to distinguish, 
they become mere tools to be manipulated toward a desired result. 
This play with semantics lends itself to inconsistency and inequity. 
3. Option C: Adopt a roommate advertising exception to section 
3604(c) 
Whether Congress finds either or both of the intimate 
association argument or the commercial speech analysis compelling, 
Congress has a third option: Congress may find that section 3604(c) 
is unconstitutional as applied to roommate choice. Congress may 
then uphold the constitutionality of 3604(c) by creating a narrow 
 
 186. Id. 
 187. United States v. Space Hunters, Inc., 429 F.3d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal 
citations removed). See generally Posting of Dave Fagundes to Prawfsblawg, supra note 24. 
 188. See Klein & Doskow, supra note 10, at 348. Because roommate choice seems to be 
an area of inherent individual discretion, most people do not even suspect that the government 
has regulated their speech in this area. Additionally, because few people who actually advertise 
are prosecuted, individuals have no experience with or even stories of prosecution that would 
alert them to the existence of 3604(c).  
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exception that allows those seeking roommates to use discriminatory 
language in their advertisements. The creation of an exception would 
likely have negative political ramifications but would not significantly 
set back anti-discrimination legislation.  
The creation of a narrow exception would likely have negative 
political ramifications. While housing discrimination is not nearly as 
rampant as it was when the FHA was passed,189 discrimination 
continues today.190 A newspaper headline stating that “Congress 
Allows Discriminatory Housing Ads” is likely to upset both those 
who fear discrimination and those who are concerned with civil 
rights and do not know the details of the constitutional issues. 
Despite public fears, an exception to section 3604(c) recognizing 
that those in the roommate scenario may legitimately advertise their 
discriminatory intents likely would not significantly set back anti-
discrimination efforts. First, the recognition of these constitutionally-
protected rights is unlikely to significantly alter behavior. For 
example, those who are likely to be discriminated against are also 
likely to not know their rights.191 Because people are unaware of the 
law, their use or lack of use of discriminatory language is not based 
on constraints of law, but on individual preference, culture, and the 
desire to follow social norms.192 Consequently, they are unlikely to 
increase their use of discriminatory language if they know that this 
language is legal. 
Second, an exception to 3604(c) would apply narrowly to 
individuals and would not extend to newspapers, websites, or other 
forums. The Mrs. Murphy Exception applies only to an owner who 
owns or controls living quarters containing no more than four 
families where she maintains and occupies one of the living quarters 
 
 189. See supra Part II.A; see also Stephen L. Ross & George C. Galster, Fair Housing 
Enforcement and Changes in Discrimination Between 1989 and 2000: An Exploratory Study 
(Univ. of Conn., Working papers 2005-16, Dep’t of Econ.), available at http://ideas. 
repec.org/p/uct/uconnp/2005-16.html#statistics.  
 190. See supra Part V.A. 
 191. See Klein & Doskow, supra note 10, at 342–43 (finding that many persons seeking 
housing know little about anti-discrimination laws in housing). Those who advertise for 
roommates are often equally unaware of these laws. 
 192. See generally Schwemm, supra note 153, at 508 (“[P]eople generally . . . tend to 
obey laws more out of a sense of their moral value and fairness and a desire to adhere to social 
norms rather than from the threat of punishment.”). 
DO NOT DELETE 11/19/2009 7:14 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2009 
1376 
as her residence.193 Accordingly, newspapers still could not legally 
print these advertisements.194  
Third, following the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in 
Roommate.com, websites may not contrive discriminatory statements 
by asking discriminatory questions.195 Accordingly, this exception 
would (1) extend only to individuals (and not institutions) and 
would (2) cover only speech that came directly from individuals. 
This exception would allow individuals to place ads on common 
boards or websites such as Craigslist; it would not, however, extend 
protection to print or other online sources.  
A narrow exception to 3604(c) would additionally harmonize 
current law and signify a step forward in anti-discrimination law. An 
exception would recognize the constitutionality of what people are 
already doing while removing the inconsistency in the law. While 
people currently routinely break the law without repercussions,196 
this change would allow people to continue their activities—but 
legally.  
Finally, an exception would benefit many people like Gene 
Kavenoki who want to advertise for and choose a roommate based 
on a “slightly warped sense of humor,” 197 attributes that they share, 
or common areas of interest. Like Kavenoki, such individuals may 
include technically discriminatory statements in their ads (“looking 
for a girl to share small apartment,” or “preferably someone 
interested in Jewish literature,” “just around the corner from a 
mosque”) while intending absolutely no offense. These individuals 
would be freed from the possibility of lawsuit and would receive the 
benefits of being able to legally advertise. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
For decades, section 3604(c) of the Fair Housing Act has 
prohibited discrimination in housing advertising based on race, 
religion, ethnicity, gender, handicap, or familial status. Despite long-
 
 193. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2) (2006). 
 194. Compare Ragin v. N.Y. Times Co., 923 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1991), with 42 U.S.C. § 
3604(c) (2006). 
 195. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 
1157, 1169 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 196. See Turner, supra note 151, at 805 (showing that few people who experience 
discrimination take action). 
 197. Liptak, supra note 1. 
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term and widespread acceptance of the constitutionality of this law, 
section 3604(c) is unconstitutional under the commercial speech 
doctrine and under the right to freedom of intimate association. Real 
tension exists between anti-discrimination policies and constitutional 
rights; therefore, Congress and the courts must carefully consider 
how to best accommodate the values of both core constitutional 
rights and important anti-discrimination policies. While some 
compromise will be necessary, it is possible to accommodate both 
values.  
Brooke Wright 
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